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Progress on the Environmental Front:
The Regulation of Industry and
Development in India
By ARzNN RosENcRANz* AND KATHLEEN D. YURCHAK**
I. Introductiont
India launched its New Economic Policy in 1991.1 Aided by the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank 2 India has en-
couraged large foreign investment in its economy and is striving to
compete with its industrialized counterparts in the global marketplace.
The current economic reform has been marked by increased industrial
investment, grandiose power and energy schemes, aggressive develop-
ment, and substantial threats to the environment.
Environmental laws have been on the books in India for over two
decades.' In comparison to some of the more developed countries,
however, legislative efforts in India are still weak. Even where laws
appear strong, lax enforcement and corrupt oversight have been the
* Armin Rosencranz (A.B. Princeton University; J.D., M.A., Ph.D. Stanford Uni-
versity), is President of the Pacific Environment and Resources Center in Sausalito. Cali-
fornia. He is an adjunct faculty member at Stanford University, the University of
California at Berkeley, and Golden Gate University School of Law.
** Kathleen D. Yurchak (B.A. Pomona College; J.D. Hastings College of the Law) is
a former Associate Attorney at the Pacific Environment and Resources Center in Sattsa-
lito, California.
t An earlier version of this Article was presented at the Institute of International
Law & Business Conference on Doing Business with the New India (November 2-3, 1935).
The authors would like to thank Paul Stanton Kibel, Staff Attorney at the Pacific
Environment and Resources Center, for his invaluable and unflagging assistance and
support.
1. Praful Bidwai, Making India Work-For the Rich, MULTINATL Motron, July-
Aug. 1995, at 9.
2. Id.
3. See e.g., Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, No. 14 (1931) (India),
reprinted in AuNu RosENcRANz Er AL., ENVIRONMENTAL L.W AND POLICY" IN INDIA:
CAsES, MATERnALs AND STATuTES, app. A (1991); Water (Prevention and Control of Pol-
lution) Act, No. 6 (1974) (India), reprinted in RosE cRANz ET At-, supra, app. B; En% iron-
ment (Protection) Act, No. 29 (1986) (India), reprinted in RosErcRANz ET AL., supra, app.
C.
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rule. However, since 1986, India's courts have taken an active role in
protecting the environment,4 and environmental organizations have
become adept at launching public interest environmental lawsuits.
India's government, under the leadership of Prime Minister
Narasimha Rao, has the uncomfortable and often impossible task of
juggling investment and economic reform with the desire to avoid en-
vironmental degradation. Balancing the right of future generations to
a healthy environment with the current needs of India's burgeoning
population is no easy task.
In this Article, we seek to explore the balance between economic
development and environmental protection. This Article should serve
to highlight the difficulties facing any newly industrialized developing
country seeking to enter the world market without destroying the
land, air, and water on which all life depends.
We will first discuss the constitutional right to a healthy environ-
ment; second, national environmental legislation; third, foreign invest-
ment in hazardous activities in the wake of the Bhopal disaster and
settlement; fourth, the development of the pollution control sector;
fifth, large hydro and thermal power projects; sixth, the "Bleak
House" proportions of litigation in India; seventh, India's activist judi-
ciary and ad hoc adjudication; eighth, environmental public interest
litigation; and finally, pressures on industries from nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) concerned about the environment.
II. The Constitutional Right to a Healthful Environment
The Indian Constitution is one of the few in the world that con-
tains specific provisions on the environment. 5 The Directive Princi-
ples of State Policy6 and the Fundamental Duties7 chapters explicitly
enunciate the national commitment to protect and improve the envi-
ronment. Many aspects of litigation in India may be daunting to po-
tential plaintiffs. However, the substantive rights discussed herein, in
combination with the onslaught of public interest litigation, the em-
powerment of NGOs, and the activist judiciary discussed below, are
all powerful tools for the people with whom industries often do not
consult and for people who are exploited and harmed by industry.
4. See discussion infra parts VIII, IX.
5. INDIA CONST. arts. 21, 48A, 51A.
6. Id. pt. IV.
7. Id. pt. IV.A.
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Three constitutional provisions bear directly on environmental
matters. First and foremost, Article 21 states: "No person shall be
deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure
established by law."8 The courts have recognized several liberties that
are implied by Article 21, including the right to a healthful environ-
ment.9 The clearest enunciation of this right occurred in a 1995 deci-
sion in which the Supreme Court held:
Article 21 protects the right to life as a fundamental right. Enjoy-
ment of life and its attainment including the right to live with
human dignity encompasses within its ambit, the protection and
preservation of environment, ecological balance, free from pollution
of air and water sanitation without which life cannot be enjoyed.
Any contra acts or actions would cause environmental pollution.
Environmental, ecological, air, water pollution etc. should be re-
garded as amounting to violation of Article 21.10
The state high courts have followed the Supreme Court's lead, and
virtually all now recognize an environmental dimension to Article 21.
These courts hold that Article 21 entitles citizens to invoke the
writ jurisdictions of the high courts and the Supreme Court under Ar-
ticles 226 and 32 of the Constitution, respectively. The latter remedy,
in particular, has proven to be a powerful and expeditious tool for
redressing environmental grievances because it provides for direct ac-
cess to the Supreme Court and eliminates the expense and delay of
normal appeals.11
Second, Article 48A requires that "[t]he State shall endeavor to
protect and improve the environment and to safeguard the forests and
wild life of the country."12 Third, Article 51A establishes that "it shall
be the duty of every citizen of India to protect and improve the natu-
ral environment including forests, lakes, rivers, and wild life and to
have compassion for living creatures."13 Though these latter two pro-
visions have traditionally been incapable of enforcement through the
exercise of writ jurisdiction, courts have increasingly relied upon them
for support in resolving environmental controversies.
8. Id. art. 21.
9. E.g., Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, 1991 A.I.R. 420 (S.C.) (India).
10. Virendra Gaur v. State of Haryana, [1995] 2 A.I.R. 577 (S.C.) (India).
11. See, eg., S. P. Gupta v. President of India, 1982 A.LIR. 149 (SC) (India); M. C.
Mehta v. Union of India, 1987 A.LR. 965 (S.C.) (India); Bangalore Medical Trust v. B. S.
Mudappa, 1991 A.I.LR 1902 (S.C.) (India).
12. INtiA CONSr. art. 48A.
13. Id. art. 51A(g).
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It is against this constitutional backdrop that disputes between
industry and India's citizenry are" resolved. Although recent legisla-
tive and judicial efforts have begun to play a role in regulating indus-
try, the foundation of most public interest litigation is India's
Constitution.
I. National Environmental Legislation
A. The Environment (Protection) Act of 1986
In the wake of the Bhopal tragedy, the Indian government en-
acted the Environment (Protection) Act of 1986 under Article 253 of
the Constitution. 4 The act is an umbrella law providing a framework
and implementation tools for the central government to coordinate
the activities of various central and state authorities acting under pre-
viously established laws, and to create new laws and regulations as the
need arises.' 5
The scope of the act is broad: "environment" is defined to include
water, air, land, and the interrelationships between ecosystems and
life forms.16 "Environmental pollution" is defined as any solid, liquid,
or gaseous substance present in such concentrations that may be, or
tend to be, injurious to the environment. 7
Section 3(1) of the act empowers the government "to take all
such measures as it deems necessary" to expedite the "purpose of pro-
tecting and improving the quality of the environment and preventing,
controlling and abating environmental pollution."18 Specifically, the
central government is authorized to set new national standards for the
quality of the environment (ambient standards) and for controlling
emissions and effluent discharges. 19 The government may also regu-
late industrial locations, establish safeguards for preventing accidents,
and collect and disseminate information about pollution.20
14. Environment (Protection) Act, reprinted in ROSENCRANZ ET AL., supra note 3,
app. C. For a more thorough discussion of the act, see Armin Rosencranz & Paul Kibel,
Environmental Policy in India: Recent Developments and Future Directions, Address at
the Institute of International Law & Business Conference on Doing Business with the New
India 3-4 (Oct. 13-14, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Pacific Environment
and Resources Center, Sausalito, California).
15. Environmental (Protection) Act, ch. II, § 3, reprinted in ROSENCRANrZ ET AL.,
supra note 3, app. C.
16. Id. ch. I, § 2(a).
17. Id. ch. I, § 2(b), (c).
18. Id. ch. I1, § 3(1).
19. Id. ch. I, § 3(2)(i)-(iv).
20. Id. ch. II, § 3(2)(v)-(xiii).
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B. Environmental Impact Assessment Notifications of 1994
Beyond the constitutional guarantees to a healthful environment,
India's legislation also provides a check on environmentally degrading
practices. However, these regulations have proven minimally effec-
tive at controlling pollution and preventing harm.21 This is often the
result of industries disregarding the regulatory scheme and govern-
ment officials neglecting to enforce it. Even when precautionary
measures are enforced, the results of such measures are often disre-
garded in hopes of attracting investment-even at the cost of the
environment.
The most powerful and well-known regulatory measure is the En-
vironmental Impact Assessment (EIA). 2 India's first attempt at a
comprehensive EIA program began on January 27, 1994, when the
Ministry of Environment and Forests issued a notification dealing with
mandatory EIAs under rule 5 of the 1986 Environment Protection
Rules. 3 The notification mandated preparation and submission of an
EIA, an Environment Management Plan (EMP), and a Project Re-
port to an Impact Assessment Agency for clearance, with further re-
view by a committee of experts in certain cases.24 Under this
notification, any member of the public had access to the EIAs or
EMPs.25 Consultation between the Ministry of Environment and For-
ests with environmental groups and local populations was also made
mandatory.
26
On May 4, 1994, however, the Ministry issued a new notification
under rule 5(3)(a) substantially diluting the earlier notification. 7
Under this most recent notification, access to EIAs and EMPs is only
available when it is "in the public interest."28 Only Project Affected
21. See, eg., RosENcRANz ET Ai., supra note 3, at chs. 5, 6, 10 (discussing persistent
air and water pollution and hazardous materials).
22. LAXSHMAN D. GuuswAmy ET AL., INTERNATioAL ENVIRONMEN TrAL LXw AND
WORLD ORDER: A PROBLEWi-ORIENTED CouRsEBooK 411 (1994).
23. MnINSTEY OF ENV'IRONMENT AND FoRESTs, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, THE E'4v.
RONNMENTAL IpACT AssmNSSmwF~r NonATmcIoN (1994) (amended Apr. 5, 1994) (copy on
file with the Pacific Environment and Resources Center, Sausalito, California) [hereinafter
EIA NOTmFCA-rON]. The enabling authority for the legislation is in the Environment
(Protection) Rules (1986), reprinted in RosENcRAmN ET AL., supra note 3, app. D.
24. EIA NOTIICATION, supra note 23, §§ 2,3.
25. Id. § 2(111)(c).
26. Id.
27. MINISTRY OF ENorRONmw AND FoRETsr, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, THE E'w-.vi
RON~mNTAL IMpACr ASsESSMENT NOTIICATION (1994) (amended May 4, 19,94) (copy on
file with the Pacific Environment and Resources Center, Sausalito, California).
28. Id. § 2(Il)(c).
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People (PAP) have a right of access; neither "public interest" nor
PAPs are clearly defined.29 In addition, the mandated EIA/EMP cate-
gory was narrowed to construction projects, thereby deregulating
other activities such as felling of trees, acquisition of land, and other
project phases that do not explicitly involve construction. Finally,
under the new notification, the project report prerequisite for clear-
ance has been eliminated, and only an EIA or an EMP is now
required.
30
EIA procedure in India seems halfhearted. Under the 1994 Envi-
ronment Protection Act Amendment, the Environmental Appraisal
Committee for River Valley and Hydroelectric Projects (EAC)-a
multidisciplinary team of experts operating under the Indian Environ-
ment Ministry-either approves, conditionally approves, or rejects
project proposals.3' In May 1995, the EAC reported that "at least
ninety percent of all dams being built in India violated environmental
guidelines. '32 These results represent the general level of compliance
with EIA procedures and principles industry-wide. Until recent
changes, the EIA in India has been largely discretionary. Businesses
and investors have approached the process lightly and government of-
ficials have disregarded the results in the name of development. With
the new notifications in place, this may begin to change-both to miti-
gate environmental damage and to prevent avoidable disasters like
Bhopal.
C. The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act of 1974
The Water Act was the culmination of a decade of debate be-
tween the central and state governments of India.33 The history and
the preamble of the act suggest that only state governments can enact
water pollution legislation.34 The act was passed by the Indian Parlia-
ment via enabling resolutions by twelve states under article 252(1) of
the Constitution.35 Article 252 empowers Parliament to enact laws
29. Id.
30. Id. § 2(I)(a).
31. Mukul Sharma, India-Environment: Most Dams Violating Environmental Condi-
tions, Inter Press Service, July 24, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Inpres File.
32. Id.
33. Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, reprinted in ROSENCRANZ ET
AL., supra note 3, app. B. For historical discussion of the act, see ROSENCRANZ ET AL.,
supra note 3, at 153-57.
34. Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, reprinted in ROSENCRANZ ET
AL., supra note 3, app. B.
35. Id.
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that concern state subjects for two or more states that consent to such
legislation.36
The act vests regulatory authority in state boards and empowers
these boards to set and enforce effluent standards for factories dis-
charging pollutants into bodies of water.37 A central board performs
the same function for union territories and coordinates activities
among the states.38 The boards control sewage and industrial effluent
by approving, rejecting, or conditionally approving applications for
consent to discharge.39 The state boards also minimize water pollu-
tion by advising state governments on appropriate sites for new
industry.4
n
A 1988 amendment eliminated the enforcement through criminal
prosecution scheme originally envisioned by the 1974 drafters and re-
placed it with a stronger, more efficient enforcement mechanism.41
Now a board may close a noncompliant industrial plant or withdraw
its power or water supply by administrative order.4Z Penalties are also
more stringent, and a citizen suit provision43 is widely used.
D. The Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act of 1981
The Air Act was promulgated under Article 253 of the Constitu-
tion." Its purpose is to address the central government's concern with
the "detrimental effect [of air pollution] on the health of the people
and also in [sic] animal life, vegetation and property."45 The Air Act's
framework is similar to, and built upon, the Water Act. 6 To enable
governments to take a comprehensive approach to pollution, the Air
Act expanded the authority of the pre-existing pollution control
boards (established under the Water Act) to include air pollution con-
36. INDIA CONS?. art. 252.
37. Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act § 17, reprinted in ROSECPANz
ET. AL., supra note 3, app. B.
38. Id. § 16.
39. Id. §§ 17(l)-(m), 25-27.
40. Id. § 17(b), (n).
41. See RosENcRANz Er Al, supra note 3, at 454-56 nn.4S-53.
42. Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act § 33A, reprinted in ROsENMC.ANZ
BT AL., supra note 3, app. B.
43. Id. §§ 41-49.
44. Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, reprinted in ROSENcPA';Z BT AL.,
supra note 3, app. A.
45. See Rosencranz & Kibel, supra note 14, at 4.
46. Id.
19961
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trol. States without pollution control boards in effect under the Water
Act were required to establish them under the Air Act.47
Under the Air Act, all industries operating within designated air
pollution control areas must obtain a permit from state boards.48 Af-
ter consultation with the central board, which sets ambient air stan-
dards, states are required to set emissions standards for industry and
automobiles.49
The 1987 amendment to the Air Act strengthened the enforce-
ment mechanism, which previously had relied on the court system and
its weak penalties.50 Presently the penalties for noncompliance are
much stiffer, and as is the case under the Water Act, a pollution con-
trol board may close down noncompliant industries or shut off their
power and water supply.51 A board may also apply for a court order
enjoining emissions that exceed standards.5 ' The Air Act also con-
tains a new citizen suit provision.
5 3
E. Legislative Regulation of Hazardous Substances
Hazardous substances are also regulated under the 1986 Environ-
ment Act.5 4 Section 2(e) of the Environment Act defines a "hazard-
ous substance" as "any substance or preparation which, by reason of
its chemical or physicochemical properties or handling, is liable to
cause harm to human beings, other living creatures, plants, micro-or-
ganisms, property or the environment." '55 The central government
first issued comprehensive rules to deal with one aspect of the toxics
problem, namely hazardous wastes, in July, 1989.56
Framed under the enabling provisions of the Environment Act, the
Hazardous Wastes (Management and Handling) Rules apply to des-
47. Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act §§ 4, 5, reprinted in ROSENCRAN Z
ET AL., supra note 3, app. A.
48. Id.§ 21.
49. Id. § 20.
50. Rosencranz & Kibel, supra note 14, at 4.
51. Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act § 31A, reprinted in ROSENCRANZ ET
AL., supra note 3, app. A.
52. Id. § 22A.
53. Id. § 43(b).
54. Environment (Protection) Act, reprinted in ROSENCRANZ Er AL., supra note 3,
app. C.
55. Id. § 2(e).
56. Hazardous Wastes (Management and Handling) Rules, Notification No. S.O.
594(E) (1989) (India), reprinted in RosENCRANZ Er AL., supra note 3, app. E. For a discus-
sion of the history of India's response to hazardous waste management, see ROSENCRANZ
ET AL., supra note 3, at 310-12.
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ignated categories of waste, such as cyanide wastes and wastes from
dyes, that are enumerated in a schedule to the rules. Radioactive
wastes, covered under the Atomic Energy Act of 1962, and wastes
discharged from ships, covered under the Merchant Shipping Act of
1958, are explicitly excluded from the Hazardous Wastes Rules.
Likewise, the rules do not apply to waste water and exhaust gases
regulated under the Water Act and Air Act. 7
Rule 4 requires a person generating hazardous wastes in quanti-
ties exceeding specific limits to take "all practical steps to ensure that
such wastes are properly handled and disposed of without any adverse
effects." Such a person is also "responsible for the proper handling,
storage, and disposal of wastes."5s
The rules prescribe a permit system administered by the state pol-
lution control boards for the handling and disposal of hazardous
wastes; no person without board authorization may collect, receive,
treat, transport, store, or dispose of hazardous wastes.5, Moreover,
the rules provide for the packaging, labelling, and transport of hazard-
ous wastes and require state governments to compile and publish an
inventory of hazardous waste disposal sites.60 Significantly, the rules
prohibit the import of hazardous wastes into India for dumping and
disposal.61 However, because the rules do not prohibit importing haz-
ardous wastes into India for recycling, there is a major loophole to
move hazardous wastes into India.
In November, 1989, the Central Department of Environment,
Forests and Wildlife issued the Manufacture, Storage and Import of
Hazardous Chemicals Rules. These rules apply to industries that
use or store specified hazardous chemicals. Rule 3 prescribes the
duties of various governmental authorities. For example, the cen-
tral and state pollution control boards are required to enforce gov-
ernmental directives and procedures pertaining to the isolated
storage of hazardous chemicals, and the district collector (or other
designated authority) is required to prepare off-site emergency
plans to contain major chemical accidents. The responsibility of
preparing and of upgrading on-site emergency plans rests with the
"occupier" who controls the industrial activity. Under rule 4, an
occupier must identify the major hazards posed by the industry,
57. Id. at 310-11.
58. Id. at 311.
59. Hazardous Wastes (Management and Handling) Rules, rule 5, reprinted in RosEN-
cRAiz T Ai.., supra note 3, app. E.
60. Id. rule 7.
61. I& rule 8.
1996]
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take steps to prevent and limit the consequences of an accident, and
inform and train workers in operational safety.62
Under rule 18, an importer of hazardous chemicals into India
must completely disclose product safety information. Where the
imported chemical is likely to cause a major accident, the desig-
nated governmental authorities are empowered to issue directions,
including an order to stop the import. The importer must also en-
sure that the transport of the chemicals from the port of entry is in
accordance with the Central Motor Vehicle Rules of 1989.
The Environment Act of December, 1989, set forth rules to
regulate the manufacture, use, import, export and storage of haz-
ardous micro-organisms and genetically engineered cells. These
rules cover industries, research institutions, and other establish-
ments that handle micro-organisms or are engaged in genetic engi-
neering. Committees of experts established under rule 4 play a
pivotal role in administering the regulations. For instance, the Re-
combinant DNA Advisory Committee is required to review world-
wide developments in bio-technology and to recommend suitable
safety regulations in recombinant research use and application.
Procedures restricting or prohibiting production, sale, import, and
use of specified organisms are prescribed by the Review Committee
on Genetic Manipulation. Rule 7 prohibits the handling, manufac-
ture, and use of hazardous micro-organisms except with the ap-
proval of the Genetic Engineering Approval Committee. Rule 17
requires a district level committee, presided over by the district col-
lector, to prepare off-site emergency plans to contain any major ac-
cidents caused by the escape of harmful micro-organisms.63
In response to the Bhopal disaster, the Indian government en-
acted the 1991 Public Liability Insurance Act.64 While purporting to
mandate insurance for all parties involved in hazardous substances,
the act exempts all government and government controlled enter-
prises, and provides for ludicrously low compensatory relief in the
event of injury.65 Thus, most foreign investors need only involve the
Indian government in their project or factor potential claims into the
cost of doing business (the highest amount available is Rs. 25,000 in
the event of total permanent disablement) in order to escape potential
burdens which the act might impose.
62. ROSENCRANz ET AL., supra note 3, at 311.
63. Id. at 311-12.
64. Public Liability (Insurance) Act, 1991 A.I.R. vol. 78, no. 1, at 4 (Act No. 6 of 1991)
(India). For a more thorough discussion of the act, see Rahmatullah Khan, India, 1992
Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 429, 431.
65. Id.
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In 1992 the National Environment Tribunal Act was passed.'
This act purports to impose strict liability for injuries caused by a
tortfeasor arising out of hazardous activities. However, by its own
terms, it limits liability to "owners," and then only if the owners are at
fault.67 In addition, it gives the new, government-appointed tribunals
unlimited discretion to dismiss all claims.6 s Further, it grants author-
ity to transfer cases directly to the Controller under the 1991 Public
Liability Insurance Act-with its aforementioned minuscule awards
and governmental exemptions. 69 Finally, the act provides for injunc-
tive relief, but only in exceptional circumstances, and limits interim
relief to fourteen days.70
Besides the Environment Protection Act, the Public Liability In-
surance Act, and the National Environment Tribunal Act, other provi-
sions touching on aspects of storage, transportation, and regulation of
hazardous substances are contained in the Central Motor Vehicle
Rules of 1989, the Insecticides Act of 1968, the Explosive Substances
Act of 1908, the Inflammable Substances Act of 1952, and the Atomic
Energy Act of 1962. The 1987 amendment to the Factories Act of
1948 also introduced a new chapter in guarding against hazardous in-
dustrial activities.71 This act attempts to increase plant safety by
measures such as increased worker participation in the monitoring of
safety measures and stiff penalties against employers for noncompli-
ance with safety norms.
IV. Foreign Investment in Hazardous Activities in the Wake
of the Bhopal Disaster and Settlement
The Bhopal disaster raised complex legal, moral, and ethical
questions about the liability of parent companies for their subsidiaries,
of transnational companies engaged in hazardous activities, and of
governments caught between attracting industry to invest in business
development while simultaneously protecting the environment and
their citizens. In the wake of the disaster and its ineffective and ineq-
uitable compensation scheme, the central government enacted legisla-
66. National Environment Tribunal Act (1992) (India) (amended 1.95) (copy on file
at the Pacific Environment and Resources Center, Sausalito, California); for a more thor-
ough discussion of this act, see Khan, supra note 64, at 429.
67. National Environment Tribunal Act, §§ 3(1)-(2), 26(1)-(2).
68. Id. § 5(1).
69. Id. § 4(4).
70. Id. § 6.
71. See B. Bowonder & S. S. Arvind, Environmental Regulations and Litigation in In-
dia, PRoJEcr APPRAisAL, Dec. 1989, at 185.
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tion designed to guard India's environment and citizens from similar
disasters.72 However, most commentators and scholars recognize that
while India's attempts have been commendable, 7 weak enforcement
of this new legislation means that the actual threat of liability and cost
faced by foreign investors is negligible.
Three legislative efforts attempted to respond to the Bhopal dis-
aster. The first act was the 1986 Environment Protection Act,74 which,
as discussed below, is neither strict nor well enforced. The second act
was the 1991 Public Liability Insurance Act.7 Lastly, the 1992 Na-
tional Environment Tribunal Act purported to create a strict liability
tort for injuries arising out of hazardous activities.76
Since the launch of the market reform program in 1991, the gov-
ernment has become more keen than ever to attract foreign invest-
ment. Fearing that Bhopal will spoil the prospects for foreign dollars,
the Indian government effectively brushed aside the bitter lesson of
irresponsible multinational behavior, at the expense of future Indian
victims. There are already many other dangerous factories in India
with more to come. Regulatory licensing has been abolished for all
but eighteen industry groups.77 Even where licensing is retained, the
government lacks data to accurately and comprehensively assess occu-
pational health hazards and environmental safety.7" This result is a
consequence of abolishing the principal agency in charge of gathering
such data, the Directorate General of Technical Development.79
A paradigmatic example of India's environmental sacrifices in its
drive to develop is the "Golden Corridor," an industrial belt running
from Vapi at the southern end of Gujarat to Mahesana, about 270
miles north, that includes 190 industrial complexes. Currently, most
factories are Indian, but foreign investors such as Shell and General
Electric have recently commenced operations. Although toxic emis-
sions and poor waste disposal practices are common in the Golden
72. Environment (Protection) Act, reprinted in ROSENCRANZ ET AL, supra note 3,
app. C.; Public Liability Insurance Act; National Environment Tribunal Act.
73. See, eg., Dwivedi & Kishore, Protecting the Environment from Pollution: A Re-
view of India's Legal and Institutional Mechanisms, 22 ASIAN SURVEY 894 (1982); Susan
Hadden, Statutes and Standards for Pollution Control in India, ECON. & POL. WKLY., Apr.
18, 1987, at 709.
74. Environment (Protection) Act, reprinted in ROSENCRANZ ET AL, supra note 3,
app. C.
75. Public Liability Insurance Act.
76. National Environment Tribunal Act.
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Corridor, India's development plans call for billions of new invest-
ment dollars by the year 2000.s°
One of the 190 industrial complexes in the Golden Corridor is
Ankleshwar, which consists of 3000 firms, about half of them chemi-
cal, operating in a forty square mile complexsl Hazardous substances
used in production processes and manufactured at Ankleshwar in-
clude pesticides, paints, fertilizers, dyes, and pulp and paper." The
Ankleshwar Industrial Association estimates that its members gener-
ate about fifty-five to sixty million gallons of liquid hazardous wastes
per day, and 50,000 tons of solid hazardous wastes per year.-3
Although the state government ordered the Gujarat Industrial Devel-
opment Corporation (GIDC) to develop solid and liquid waste treat-
ment plans in 1988, no landfill site has yet been chosen, nor does any
common incinerator exist. As a result, sludge and solid waste cur-
rently lies in the open.84 As for liquid wastes, about fifty of the plants,
consisting of more than 500 employees, have their own waste water
treatment plants.'7 The remainder of the plants simply dump their
liquid wastes into storm sewers, canals, and ditches.86 Some of this
waste goes directly to the Amlakhari River, which provides drinking
water to the villages through which it passes. In order to bypass the
river, the GIDC built five pumping stations to channel the waste to a
nearby estuary, but the stations often break down or are flooded.8?
An even more contaminated site is the Nandesari industrial es-
tate, sixty miles north of Ankleshwar, near the city of Baroda. Fifty to
sixty plants in the estate produce chlorine-based chemicals, and the
contamination is largely the result of chlorine.,- The Gujarat Refin-
ery, India Petrochemicals Ltd., Gujarat Alkalis and Chemicals Ltd.,
and the Gujarat Fertilizer Company are among the major polluters1S'
The regional officer for the Gujarat Pollution Control Board (GPCB)
lacks the staff and resources to control and regulate the existing indus-
try, let alone the anticipated growth. The regulatory focus has been
80. Kenny Bruno, Gujarat's Industrial Sacrifice Zones. MULTINAT'L Mo IroP._ July-
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on improving waste water treatmentg--currently achieved by carry-
ing the waste thirty miles through an effluent channel to the estuary at
the mouth of the Mahi River where dilution renders the waste harm-
less.91 However, other experts believe that dilution merely relocates
the problem.92 These experts maintain that certain toxic substances,
such as heavy metals and nonvolatile organic chemicals, are not detox-
ified or destroyed by treatment and travel with the effluent to the final
discharge point.93 Examples of these substances include mercury and
dioxin, both of which are known to bioaccumulate in fish and humans.
Additionally, some of the effluent is inadvertantly intercepted by
farmers along the channel and used for irrigation. No studies on the
estuary's ecology or the waste's effect have been conducted.
Other problems besides the waste production process include the
many hazardous products manufactured as a part of India's bur-
geoning industry. For example, in Ankleshwar and Nandesari, indus-
try is producing Paraquat, the most widely used herbicide in the world
and a highly toxic chemical which causes systemic poisoning after pro-
longed exposure.94 The hazardous material problem has grown with
agricultural chemical sales which zoomed from $168 million in 1987 to
$392 million in 1991. Further, the value of agrochemical exports by
Indian firms almost tripled in that same period.95
The GPCB maintains that certain environmentally sound steps
have been taken.96 Benzene dyes, for example, which are known to
cause cancer, have been eliminated at Nandesari and Ankleshwar.
97
But some contend that closely related substances and known carcino-
gens have been substituted in their place.98 A pulp and paper mill in
Ankleshwar with a history of enormous effluent problems has in-
stalled a new treatment system and now meets standards for chemical
oxygen demand and suspended solids. 99 However, the same plant,
which uses a chlorine bleaching technique, is monitored neither for
dioxin nor for organochlorine discharges, both of which are known
90. Id
91. Id
92. 1d at 19-20.
93. Id. at 20.
94. Telephone Interview with the Pesticides Action Network, San Francisco, Califor-
nia (Oct. 1995).
95. Bruno, supra note 80, at 21.
96. See id
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effluents from the process. Gujarat Alkalies and Chemicals Ltd. has
replaced mercury cells with more worker-safe membrane cells at its
chloralkalai plant, but created a new problem by dumping the mer-
cury cells and a huge pile of solid waste on an open estate; the ground-
water has not been tested for contamination.'0°
No studies have been conducted regarding the health effects on
workers, the health effects on surrounding communities, or chronic
occupational diseases, and no unions exist to lobby for improved
worker safety conditions. In more densely populated areas, industries
fearing liability have actually sued to move people. For example, in
Thane-Baliapur, 200,000 people live within one and a half miles of an
industrial belt that includes a dozen multinational companies.',,
These companies sued to have the residents removed without com-
pensation. 0 2 Because the action failed, people and industry remain
side-by-side.
In the meantime, analysts predict increased investment of S7-8
billion in the Gujarat chemical industry by the year 2000.103 Through
India's economic liberalization program, much of the investment is ex-
pected to come from transnational corporations (TNCs) such as Shell,
ICI, DuPont, Dow, and Hoechst. 0 4 It is not surprising that as devel-
oped countries ban or intensively regulate the chemical industries at
home, there has been a boom in chemical industry investment in de-
veloping countries like India.'05 While TNCs transfer their produc-
tion sites, however, there is no corresponding transfer of waste
management technology. Even though the Indian Chemical Manufac-
turers Association implemented the Responsible Care program in
1992, only forty firms have begun to implement the voluntary meas-
ures.10 6 Thus, waste management technology remains a step behind
the rest of industrial investment in India. However, as India seeks to
compete in the global market, its interest in pollution control technol-
ogies correspondingly will continue to increase.
100. Id
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V. The Development of the Pollution Control Sector
India is a party to GATT's 1994 Uruguay Round. As a result,
India's pollution control will be overseen by the World Trade Organi-
zation, whose regulations mandate environmentally responsible haz-
ardous waste management. 107 Thus, India is eager to clean up its act.
On July 27, 1994, the World Bank announced the launching of a
pilot program, the Industrial Pollution Prevention Project, designed to
encourage private industry to help clean up pollution in India. 0 s
Companies wanting to improve environmental compliance records or
productivity may apply for funding.10 9 This project is specifically
targeted at medium to large scale pollution caused by emissions in-
cluding carbon dioxide, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, and chemical
oxygen. 110 The Industrial Pollution Prevention Project will receive
nearly half of its estimated $330 million cost from local sources.11
An additional $300 million for pollution control technology has
been made available through the Asia Development Program. 112 Ja-
pan's Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund provided $194 million
for a project to channel treated waste water for industrial use in Ma-
dras."13 The Indian government also offers substantial tax breaks and
subsidies of up to twenty-five percent of capital costs for construction
of common effluent treatment plants. 1 4 The World Bank chipped in
with an additional $160 million, channeled through the Industrial De-
velopment Bank of India."'
In 1995 Indian government and trade officials attended a major
waste exhibition in the United States and toured various facilities, in-
cluding a methane-to-energy project operated by WMX Technolo-
gies." 6 The Indians were there to learn about the state-of-the-art
107. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Dec. 15, 1993, GATr
Doc. MTN/FA I.G.7.2., 33 I.L.M. 1144.
108. World Bank Program Targets Industrial Pollution Clean Up, BNA Int'l Env't
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waste management technologies available in the United States.11 7 Ac-
cording to the United States Department of Commerce, the cities of
New Delhi, Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta-each of which produces
about 4000 tons of solid wastes per day-are particularly interested in
acquiring new environmental technology.118
Thus, while industrial and other pollution problems in India per-
sist, the Indian central and state governments are actively searching to
invest in pollution control technology. As with any investment in In-
dia, there are inherent business risks. Unlike many industrial invest-
ment opportunities, however, pollution control technology does not
meet with the popular resistance that plagues projects carrying per-
ceived environmental threats. As a politically neutral issue, pollution
control investments may be one of the soundest investments in India,
and could remain a market largely untapped by American investors
who are quickly losing ground to their more aggressive European
colleagues.
VI. Large Power Projects
One area of investment opportunity that has not been overlooked
by American and other international businesses is the power industry
in India. Both the new "fast track" thermal projects and the older
hydropower projects are substantially financed by foreign invest-
ment.119 However, both types of projects are plagued by controversy,
instability, and delay.120 All of the major power projects discussed in
this section are environmentally questionable, and all have met with
active and often violent resistance by NGOs and citizens. All have
checkered pasts and uncertain futures.
A. Thermal Power Projects
As part of the liberalized economic reform policies introduced in
India in 1991, the Indian government decided to open the power sec-
tor to private investment.121 Thus far, "foreign private investors have
shown an interest in at least thirty-six power projects in India, gener-
ating a total of 20,000 megawatts of power" and a total worth of $25
117. d
118. Id
119. See infra notes 121-25, 199 and accompanying text.
120. See infra notes 135-44, 160-61, 179, 216-23 and accompanying text.
121. Pratap Chatterjee, Enron Deal Blows a Fuse, MULTINAT'L MOITOP., July-Aug.
1994, 14, 15.
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billion.1 Despite all this, the Central Electricity Authority in India
anticipates that it will need at least 48,000 more megawatts of power
by 1998.123 As part of the central government's policy to attract pri-
vate investment, India initiated a fast track project scheme which ap-
proved power projects in record time and with unprecedented
concessions. 124
As of September 1994, there were eight fast track projects under
negotiation. 12 Two of these, both in Maharashtra, were phase one
and phase two of the Enron plant and would have produced a com-
bined total capacity of 2015 megawatts. 26 Based in Houston, Texas,
Enron is the world's largest natural gas company and it negotiated the
$2.8 billion deal to build India's single largest power plant. 127 The
deal would have been funded with international loans to be paid back
by the state electricity board through guaranteed electricity tariffs be-
ginning at eight cents per kilowatt and rising to thirty-three cents per
kilowatt by the year 2017, the project's termination date.128 The cur-
rent consumer rate in India is 4.3 cents per kilowatt. 29 The state gov-
ernment's loan was also insured by the national government through
the fast track counter-guarantee system.' 30 The project would have
been managed by the newly formed Dabhol Power Company, a con-
sortium including Enron, Bechtel, and General Electric.1 31
Economists with Prayas, an NGO in Pune, Maharashtra, esti-
mated that Enron would have earned a thirty-two percent after-tax
rate of return on the project-roughly three times the rate of return
for a similar project in the United States. 132 In addition, the econo-
mists pointed out that Enron completed a similar project in England
at half the price.' 33 Finally, the economists noted that through various
energy conservation measures, even taking into account penalties of
122. Sameera Khan, India Offering Lesson in 'Power' Politics; Energy Disputes Illustrate
Need to Manage Political Risks, Bus. INs., Aug. 28, 1995, at G1, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Busins File.
123. Id.
124. P. Purkayastha, The Price of Power, DowN To EARTH, Sept. 15, 1995, at 28.
125. Id.
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131. Chatterjee, supra note 121, at 14.
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up to $286 million for breach of contract, the government could save
money by expelling Enron from the country.134
Citizen opposition to the Enron project was particularly strong." -
Villagers, fearing that pollution from the plant would destroy their
fisheries, coconuts, and mango trees, rioted in May 1995.1'2 In addi-
tion, two parties in the new state government-the Hindu nationalist
Shiv Sena Party and the Bharatiya Janata Party-ran on an anti-En-
ron platform. 137
The Enron project initially provoked four lawsuits, and at least
five more writ petitions have been filed since.1 3s Of the original four,
only one, which alleged inadequate EIAs and risk assessment, was
partially successful. As a result, Enron was forced to comply with
newer and stricter EIA notification guidelines. However, beyond de-
lay, the environmental suit was ultimately unable to substantially
modify the project. The case was, however, a significant victory for
public interest litigants simply by virtue of the opportunity to confront
and impede the corporate giant.
139
In August 1995, the state government of Maharashtra backed out
of the huge Enron project, citing environmental concerns as the rea-
son and hinting at the possibility of corruption. 4 ' However, many
suspect that it was a purely political move, based on the platform of
the new party in power. After Enron threatened to sue the state gov-
ernment for breach of contract, the government reopened negotia-
tions the following month.14 1 Enron's fate, along with the fate of the
other seven fast track projects, currently hangs in the balance. 142
The Enron project's tangled progress is significant for many rea-
sons. As the largest single investment in India's new economy and the
largest thermal power plant in the nation, Enron came to symbolize
the entire new economic reform movement. The fate of the deal was
seen by many as a weather vane, indicative of the fate of all foreign
investment in India. During the anti-Enron campaign race in
Maharashtra, the United States Department of Energy issued a
134. ld. at 16-17.
135. Chatteree, supra note 121, at 14.; see also, Khan, supra note 122, at G3.
136. Chatteree, supra note 121, at 14.
137. Khan, supra note 122, at G1.
138. Interview with Kerban Anklesaria, attorney representing environmental public in-
terest groups, in New York, N.Y. (Oct. 24, 1995).
139. ld.
140. Khan, supra note 122, at GI.
141. Chatterjee, supra note 121, at 14-17.
142. Khan, supra note 122, at GI.
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threatening statement, backed by the British government and other
foreign investors, warning of the consequences to foreign investment
in India if the Enron contract were cancelled. 43 The Indian newspa-
pers responded with indignation to what they perceived as Western
imperialism. 144 The national government was frantic over the poten-
tial derailment of the largest single foreign project in India, and the
former State Chief Minister, Sharad Pawar, issued dire predictions for
the future of foreign investment in India if the new government were
to call off the deal.145 The Enron project's uncertain future, the polit-
ical instability generated by state elections, and India's lack of a cohe-
sive investment plan have all combined to make foreign investors in
India's thermal energy market understandably anxious.
B. Hydropower Projects
India began constructing large dams shortly after indepen-
dence. 46 Large-scale river development began in 1930 with the Met-
tur dam on the Cauvery and increased after independence with the
Bhakra Nangal and Hirakud projects. 47 India spent $7 billion on the
construction of irrigation projects between 1950 and 1980.11 By the
middle of the 1980s, an enormous amount of construction had taken
place. Over fifteen hundred large dams were constructed, hydroelec-
tricity generation increased by approximately forty-eight billion kilo-
watt hours (kWh), and surface irrigation potential had increased 21.8
million hectares. 49 Currently, however, India is using only 13% of its
total hydroelectric potential, which is estimated at 80,000
megawatts. °
These dams are the cornerstones of large scale multi-purpose river
valley projects intended to meet regional needs for irrigation, hy-
droelectric power and flood control. Since the 1950's, when the ear-
liest of these giant irrigation projects was launched, the government
[both state and national] have vigorously promoted dam building as
143. Chatterjee, supra note 121, at 15.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. RoZENCRANZ Er A., supra note 3, at 276.
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a means to economic progress. Today, all major rivers in India are
either dammed or are in the process of being dammed.151
These dams also represent one of the most troubled sectors of India's
foreign investment-in terms of delays and costs, 5 2 public percep-
tion, 5 3 and forced withdrawal of international funds due to domestic
and international pressure from NGOs.
5 4
In the past two decades, citizen protests, international human
rights concerns, and environmental pressures have increasingly been
brought to bear against these projects. The central issue in the citizen
campaigns is displacement: The backwaters of a large dam generally
displace thousands of people-often tribals and forest-dwellers who
are the poorest and most powerless members of society.1 s5 In fact, by
1992 canal and dam projects had displaced an estimated eleven mil-
lion people, primarily indigenous; of these, only 25% had been reha-
bilitated.5 6 By 1994, Vijay Paranjpye of the University of Pune
estimated the number of displaced people due solely to dam construc-
tion at thirty million. 57 The Indian government has stonewalled pro-
tests by displaced and soon-to-be displaced people, drawing
unfavorable attention from the international human rights commu-
nity.lSS In addition, the structural design of dams built in seismically
unstable areas has drawn attention to the potential loss of life that
could result from a dam that fails.'5 9
Today, large dams are India's most controversial environmental
issue, both domestically and internationally. Funding for dams is
often in the form of loans from other countries or multinational devel-
opment banks and therefore raises international issues of responsibil-
ity for unmitigated human and environmental damage.
Generally, large dams benefit urban populations located far
downstream and harm those people who have paid for the dam with
their land and community. When environmental and health costs are
151. RosENcRNz ET A.., supra note 3, at 276.
152. See infra note 205 and accompanying text.
153. See infra notes 160-61, 216-23 and accompanying text.
154. See infra notes 212-16 and accompanying text.
155. RosENcANz ET AL., supra note 3, at 276; See also Mahesh Uniyal, India: Rising
Green Consciousness, But Rules Are Not Watertight, Inter Press Service, Apr. 1, 19?2, aral-
able in LEXIS, News Library, Inpres File.
156. Uniyal, supra note 155.
157. David Dahmen, Environment Major Dam Construction Projets Criticized, Inter
Press Service, Aug. 3, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Inpres File.
158. See infra notes 205,216-23 and accompanying text.
159. India's Changing Landscape, EcoNoMsr, Mar. 5, 1983, at 94, avadable in LEXIS,
News Library, Econ File.
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fully accounted for, large dams are often ecologically unsound and ec-
onomically unjustified. Costs include the loss of forests and wildlife,
waterlogging, siltation, loss of arable land, and increases in water-
borne diseases. 60 In addition, the religious significance that many In-
dians attribute to free flowing rivers and the losses sustained by
communities endangered by faulty construction are rarely taken into
account.
1. The Tehri Dam Project
The Tehri Dam Project-one part of a larger plan to trap the wa-
ters of the Upper Ganges basin-is surrounded by ongoing contro-
versy. The Tehri project is a giant clay core, rock fill dam, located at
the confluence of the Bhagirathi and Bhilangana rivers, close to the
Garhwali town of Tehri.161 The lake created by the dam will be 867
feet high and 16.8 square miles wide.1 62 It will submerge numerous
villages, including Tehri, a historical capital.163 It has been estimated
that as many as 13,840 families will be forced to relocate because of
the project."6 Proponents of the dam point out that it would generate
2400 megawatts of electricity, create irrigation facilities for 270,000
hectares (667,000 acres) of land, and create a daily supply of 162 mil-
lion gallons of water to New Delhi. 6
Controversy over the Tehri dam project has focused on three is-
sues: First, the completed dam will displace many people and sub-
merge several towns, among them the town of Tehri;166 second, the
region is vulnerable to seismic activity and the dam may be structur-
ally incapable of withstanding earthquakes or may even cause them;16 7
and third, the failure of the dam would kill hundreds of thousands of
people and destroy towns of immense religious significance. Of par-
ticular concern are the 170,000 inhabitants of the Hindu holy towns of
160. EDWARD GOLDSMITH & NICHOLAS HILDYARD, SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL
EFFECI'S OF LARGE DAMS 71-91 (1984).
161. ROSENCRANZ ET AL., supra note 3, at 288.
162. VIAY PARANJPYE, EVALUATING THE TEHRI DAM: AN EXTENDED COST BENEFIT
APPRAISAL, 23-29, 42, 137-38 (1988), excerpted in ROSENCRANZ ET AL., supra note 3, at
289-95.
163. Nirmal Ghosh, A Megadam Runs Through It, Bus. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1994, at 13,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Bustms File.
164. 1d.
165. Id.
166. PARANJPYE, supra note 162, at 289.
167. "Dams can cause earthquakes if the weight of the water activates previously unno-
ticed faults in the earth as was the case in Koynanagar in 1967 when 200 people were killed
and 1,500 were injured." India's Changing Landscape, supra note 159, at 94.
[Vol. 19:489
The Regulation of Industry and Development in India
Hardwar and Rishikesh, located downstream.1 6S Both the resettle-
ment policies and the structural flaws of the dam have provoked civil
protests, lawsuits, and international attention, all of which repeatedly
stalled the project since its beginning in 1978.
The Tehri project was challenged in the Supreme Court of India
in a writ petition by the Tehri Bandh Virodhi Sangarash Samiti
(TBVSS) in 1985.169 In April 1987, the Indian National Trust for Art
and Cultural Heritage (INTACH), an intervenor in this petition and a
leading NGO in the field of conservation, sponsored an independent
assessment of the economic feasibility of the dam.17L The INTACH
team concluded that when social and environmental costs and benefits
were factored in, the benefit to cost ratio of the Tehri dam worked out
to 0.56:1171-well short of the 1.5:1 ration adopted by the Planning
Commission to sanction such projects. 17'
In 1986 the Soviet Union agreed to help fund the project with
loans at extremely concessional terms."73 As part of the agreement
with the Indian government, Soviet experts conducted a review of the
proposed project and made several ominous findings, the most fright-
ening of which was that the Indian planners had not adequately taken
into consideration the high seismicity of the Tehri area. 174 The IN-
TACH team, under the leadership of Vijay Paranjpye, also found that
while the Indian government projected a useful life of 100 years, the
actual siltation rate would render the dam useless in sixty-two years or
less.' 75 Finally, whereas the government put the number of displaced
people, or "oustees," at 46,000, the INTACH team found the project
would displace 85,600 people. 76
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition in 1990.177 Although a
blue ribbon commission unanimously concluded that the Tehri project
should not be approved, the central government relied on an opinion
168. India: Tehri Dam vs the Public and the Wrath of Kali, Ihfr'L DAMS NEVL. IEarth
Island Institute, San Francisco, Ca.), No. 5, Sept.-Oct. 1987, at 3.
169. Tehri Bandh Virodhi Sangarsh Samiti v. Uttar Pradesh, J.T. 199 4 S.C. 519, re-
printed in RosENcRANz ET AT., supra note 3, at 295-300.
170. RosNr ANz r ETU.. supra note 3, at 28
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. P. PEARCE, THE DAMIED: RIVERS, DAmS AND THE COMING WORLD WATEP
Ciusis 144-52 (1992).
174. RozENCRANZ ET AL, supra note 3, at 295.
175. Id. at 294.
176. Id. at 295.
177. Tehri Bandh Virodhi Sangarsh Samiti v. Uttar Pradesh, J.T. 1990 4 S.C. 519, re-
printed in ROSENCRANZ Er AL., supra note 3, at 295-300.
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of the Department of Mines to convince itself and the Court that the
project was sound.1
78
In 1995, faced with overwhelming opposition to the dam, the gov-
ernment agreed to another review of the project. 179 The government
invited activists to select their own representatives to work with offi-
cials on the review panel. The government promised that the panel
would consider the ecological, economic, social, and cultural impacts
of the Tehri Project, all of which the 1992 panel had ignored.180 How-
ever, because the 1992 panel and two prior reviews had considered the
seismic safety of the project, the Prime Minister declared that project
a dead issue.' 8 '
On August 4, 1995, the Indian government issued a statement de-
claring that there was "no going back on the Tehri Dam, on which it
has spent over Rs. 900 million.' 1 2
Thus, in the face of overwhelming environmental and health con-
cerns, popular protests, and international condemnation, the govern-
ment is pursuing the construction of the Tehri Dam. Nevertheless, a
marked decrease in funding has resulted from the negative publicity
surrounding the dam.
8 3
2. The Narmada Valley Project
Plagued by even more controversy is the Narmada Valley Project,
designed to harness the power of the Narmada River. The Narmada
basin covers an area of 98,796 square kilometers and is home to
twenty-one million people.184 About a quarter of the basin is covered
by moist and dry deciduous forests and approximately 60% of it has
black soils composed of silty clay with low permeability. 18 5
Although the Narmada Valley Project was conceived in 1946, fi-
nal planning and work on it commenced only after the Narmada
Water Disputes Tribunal passed its final orders in 1978.186 This tribu-
nal was established in 1969 under India's Interstate Water Disputes
178. Id
179. Uniyal, supra note 155.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Internal Affairs: Water Minister Says Tehri Dam Not To Be Scrapped, BBC SuM.
MARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Aug. 5. 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
BBCSWB File.
183. Kathy Svitill, The Coming Himalayan Catastrophe, DISCOVER, July 1995, at 80.
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Act of 1956 to resolve the dispute on river water sharing among the
riparian states of Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, and Maharashtra.' 7 The
Tribunal established conditions regarding the resettlement and reha-
bilitation of the thousands of oustees who would be displaced by the
submergence. 18s
The Narmada Valley Project, if and when it is completed, wiU
rank as the largest irrigation project ever planned and implemented as
a single unit anywhere in the world.189 By 2040, the project authori-
ties hope to complete thirty-one major dams (eleven on the Narmada
and twenty on its tributaries), 135 medium dams, and 3000 minor
dams.19 Of the thirty-one major dams, those at Tawa and Barna are
complete and a third one at Bargi is nearing completion."" The most
controversial of the major dams are the Sardar Sarovar Project (SSP)
in Gujarat and the Narmada (Indira) Sagar Project (NSP) in Madhya
Pradesh. The NSP, an enormous submergence zone that will create
the biggest artificial reservoir in India, is years behind the SSP in con-
struction." 2 The SSP, however, is well under way and has become the
rallying cry of international and Indian NGOs, who view the SSP as a
symbol of everything that is wrong with the way large dams are er-
ected-from international funding to environmental impacts to dis-
placement and abuse of people.
The SSP is intended to bring drinking water to drought ridden
regions of Gujarat. The dam will impound water in a 455 feet high
reservoir that will submerge 37,000 hectares of land in the three states
of Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Madhya Pradesh.193 It will also divert
9.5 million acre feet (MAF) of water into a canal and irrigation sys-
tem.'94 The canal is the biggest in the world; in places it stretches 450
kilometers in length and reaches 100-250 kilometers in width.11-5 The
total length of the canal's distribution will be 75,000 kilometers and
will require 80,000 hectares of land, more than twice the land sub-
merged by the reservoir. 9 At least 100,000 people in 245 villages live
187. Id
188. BRADFORD MORSE & THOiAs BERGER, SARDAR SAROVAR, THE REFOP.T OF THE
INDEPENDENT REVIEW 19-22 (1992).
189. RosENcRANZ ET Ai., supra note 3, at 302.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 303.
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in the submergence area of the SSP dam alone.197 In addition, the
canal and irrigation system will affect 140,000 farmers. 198 Thousands
of additional people who live downstream will also be affected. 19'
Narmada shares many of the problems and dangers which have
marked the Tehri project, including inadequate EIAs, funding set-
backs, and faulty construction. However, it has also gained interna-
tional notoriety in issues of international funding, resettlement and
relocation, and human rights violations.
Although international aid for the Narmada Valley Project came
from many sources, the most controversial source was the World
Bank, which promised to finance 15% of the SSP.200 In 1985 the Bank
lent the three state governments of Gujarat, Maharashtra, and
Madhya Pradesh $450 million to finance the SSP-both the dam and
the canal.20 ' The state governments then applied for an additional
$350 million to complete the canal and $90 million for the related
Narmada Basin Development Project.2°2 This financing initially rep-
resented both international approval of the project itself and interna-
tional satisfaction with the Indian government's planning and
execution of the project. As events unfolded, however, Narmada
came to symbolize the most embarrassing and most widely criticized
project in the World Bank's history. For the first time, the Bank ter-
minated funding in response to popular pressure.0 3 This same pres-
sure provided the impetus for the traditionally secretive Bank to open
its procedures to the public, reconsider and rewrite its guidelines on
funding, and reexamine its currently funded projects.2"
Responding to mounting domestic and international protest, in
1991 the Bank commissioned an independent review team to reexam-
ine the SSP. The team was led by Bradford Morse, former chief of the
United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and Thomas Berger,
former British Columbia Supreme Court Justice. Over 400 pages in
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gress on the dam and its noncompliance with the World Bank's loan
conditions. The report recommended that the World Bank "step
back" from the project.2"'
Prior to the release of the independent review, C.C. Patel, the
chairman of the project, stated, "It doesn't matter what they say, we
will go ahead. 20 6 The World Bank shared Mr. Patel's viewpoint. The
day before the official release of the independent review, Bank Presi-
dent Lewis Preston issued a statement describing the Bank's contin-
ued involvement in the SSP as "justified," despite the review.' 7 The
European Parliament issued a ten-point resolution in August 1992
calling on the Bank to withdraw from the SSP and pay compensation
to the oustees.2's It also called on the Indian central and state govern-
ments to halt the entire Narmada Valley Project.?O The Swedish Min-
istry of Finance also asked the Bank to reconsider its involvement.210
Chairmen of both the U.S. Senate and House Foreign Operations
Subcommittees, Senator Patrick Leahy and Representative David
Obey, respectively, and Senator Robert Kasten, ranking member of
the Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittee, wrote to the Bank in
July 1992, characterizing the SSP as a "fiasco" and urging the Bank to
withdraw.2
11
However, in October 1992, by a narrow vote among its directors,
the World Bank decided to continue funding the SSP 2' Finally, on
March 31, 1993, the Indian government canceled the remaining $170
million loan from the World Bank, in an implicit admission that the
government could not meet the new "benchmark" conditions associ-
ated with continued assistance.213 However, the Indian government
also made clear that it was not abandoning the project and would seek
funding elsewhere.214
205. The results of the independent review team were published in MORSE & BP.GEr',
supra note 18S, passim.
206. Anne MCilroy, The "Nowhere People" Fight a Giant Dan India: 100,00 Fce
Losing Their Homes, VANCOUxER SUN, Mar. 5, 1992, at Al.
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RIvEs REv.. No. 3, Third Quarter 1992, at 1, 15.
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Of all the issues that have received attention during the develop-
ment of the Narmada Valley Project and the international and domes-
tic protests against it, none has generated as much controversy and
litigation as the issue of resettlement and rehabilitation of Project Af-
fected People (PAPs). Save the Narmada Movement (known by its
acronym NBA), the most widely known group of protesters, has built
its widespread support around the displacement issue. The World
Bank's independent review team and the international community
both focused on and fully addressed the issue of displacement.15 In
1991 activists from Japan, India, Europe, and the United States held
an international symposium which focused solely on the Narmada Val-
ley Project entitled Destruction in the Name of Development.216 The
symposium called on the government of India to halt the entire pro-
ject because no satisfactory resettlement plan had yet been devised. 1 7
Of particular significance is the fact that most oustees are tribal
people, outside the Hindu caste system.218 While many of them have
been farming their land for generations, they do not have title to it.
Other lands originally owned by the oustees have become state-owned
forest reserves where it is illegal to farm. 19 Most oustees, therefore,
will not receive any compensation for their land.220
Beginning with the Narmada Valley Water Disputes Tribunal or-
der, through various private and public interest lawsuits by individuals
and NGOs, and including the pending 1994 case filed before the In-
dian Supreme Court by the NBA,z1 the issue of resettlement and re-
habilitation has generated vast amounts of litigation.
Beyond the specific violations involved in mass displacements,
evictions, and the Narmada Valley Project's inadequate rehabilitation
measures, the Project has been marked by frequent human rights vio-
lations, primarily against protesters and NBA leaders. These viola-
tions include unexplained police detentions, abuse while in custody,
beatings of noncompliant oustees and protesters, and in a few tragic
cases, injuries and deaths resulting from police shooting into
215. See generally MORSE AND BERGER, supra note 188, passim.
216. Activists Around the World Call for Halt to India's Narmada Dam, Reuter Libr.
Rep., May 26, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuwld File.
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crowds.m Oppression and violence have thus joined the list of tactics
employed by the Indian government to silence protestors.
The repetitive nature of these violations has drawn the attention
of the international human rights community, which has formed the
Narmada International Human Rights Panel and now holds Interna-
tional Narmada Symposiums. Here, activists present the reports of
NGOs chronicling abuses in India associated wvith the Narmada Valley
Project.223
Thus, the construction of dams in India has become an explosive
issue. Protests against these projects have become a rallying point for
domestic and international environmental and human rights NGOs.
Although they have had significant international impact, especially
upon funding, they have had little domestic success in halting
projects 24 Thermal power projects, newer and less-tested, have not
yet garnered the negative international attention that has plagued in-
vestment opportunities in hydropower projects. Domestically, how-
ever, thermal power projects are quickly gaining notoriety. Perhaps
the most pointed lesson to be learned from all large power project
schemes thus far is that without popular support of project-affected
people, the construction of any project in India becomes too fraught
with political baggage to be smoothly executed.
VII. The "Bleak House" Proportions of Litigation in India2s
While environmental public interest litigation has burgeoned in
the last decade, and the courts have been seeking to redress environ-
mental wrongs through innovative nontraditional jurisprudence, the
history of litigation in India is bleak from a plaintiff's perspective. The
weaknesses in India's jurisprudence have prompted litigants to seek
an American forum whenever possible, as in the Bhopal case. These
222. Lowe UDALL & MARIE KLEINER, ENVIROMIENTAL DEFENsE FUND. Hum.AN
RIGHTS VIOLAriONs AssOcIATED WITH THE WoRLD BANK FINANCED SAP.D v SXPOVAr
DAM PR jEcr IN WESRmmN IriA (1992) (presented at the Third International Narmada
Symposium in Tokyo, Apr. 29, 1992); Villager Killed, Another Injured in Indian Dam Pro-
test, Japan Economic Newswire, July 20,1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, JEN Fila;
Police Open Fire in Maharashtra Village Tribal Youth Dead, Three Villagers Seriouslv
Wounded, ECOLOGIST, Nov. 19, 1993, at 1-4; Narmada Bachao Andolan, A Chronology of
Events in the Narmada Valley in Akrani Taluka, Dhule District (Nov. 25, 1995) (on fit,
with the Pacific Environment and Resources Center, Sausalito, California).
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weaknesses have also attracted investment in industries of dubious
safety, often with little regard for the environment. Since it has been
extremely difficult for plaintiffs to get compensation for tort injuries,
industries have flourished in this "judgment free" zone, while scoffing
at health and safety requirements.2 6 India still remains a haven for
those who wish to do business without being overly troubled by reper-
cussions of the traditional variety that are so readily available in other
countries' judicial systems.
A primary weakness in India's judicial system is its undeveloped
tort law. Tort actions never gained popularity in India; indeed, tort
law was eliminated from the common-law codification during the late
19th century.1 7 When tort cases are litigated they typically involve
intentional torts; relatively few cases deal with negligence or strict
liability.
When tort cases are brought in India, the delays in litigation are
notorious and daunting. Between 1975 and 1984 there were only fifty-
six nonmotor vehicle tort cases reported in the All India Reporter;
each took an average of twelve years and nine months to complete,
although all of them were relatively routine and uncomplicated
cases.22- There are multiple reasons for the delays. India has very few
courts-about one-tenth as many per capita as the United States.3 9
Courts have also established elaborate provisions for multiple inter-
locutory appeals. Such provisions were originally designed to facili-
tate colonial supervision of the local inhabitants, and they are still
maintained despite the complications to which they give rise.2"'
Other vestiges of colonialism hamper litigants in India. Thinking
the Indians were too litigious, the British exacted high ad valorem fees
on the use of the courts. These fees persist today, often diverting tort
actions into criminal prosecutions and injunctive relief.23' Recovery
of money damages is also infrequent, and when awarded, compensa-
tion is often trivial. There are no contingency fees available, and costs
are often shifted to losing parties, thereby discouraging innovation
and pro bono work in tort actions.232
226. Id.
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While India's legal profession is well established, attorney experi-
ence is generally limited to courtroom performance. Lawyers in India
have very little experience and training in investigation and fact find-
ing. Few attorneys specialize; with only a few exceptions, there have
been no collective efforts to allow the division of labor and combining
of expertise that would predicate specialization in any one field.33
Finally, Indian civil procedure is not structured to enable success-
ful tort litigation. Broad discovery rights and procedures for complex
litigation involving large amounts of evidence or numbers of parties
simply do not exist.231 As Professor Marc Galanter has observed,
"Bar and bench, though they contain many brilliant and talented indi-
viduals, have a limited fund of experience and skills and a limited or-
ganizational capacity to address massive cases involving complex
questions of fact."'  Actually, the brilliant and talented individuals to
whom Professor Galanter refers have begun to creatively redress envi-
ronmental wrongs outside the scope of traditional tort law adjudica-
tion. These innovations include an activist judiciary and a burgeoning
field of public interest litigation.
VIII. India's Activist Judiciary and Ad Hoc Adjudication
The Supreme Court in India is composed of a three judge bench
which has discretion to hear or reject whatever cases come before it,
usually by writ petitionP16 Once the Supreme Court decides to hear a
case, it may, by its own motion, take any number of courses not avail-
able to the more procedurally constrained courts of England or the
United States. 37 For example, the Indian Supreme Court may em-
panel a body of experts, order an independent investigation of the
case, and order the defendant to bear the costs of either or both3-"
The Indian courts are also less constrained by precedent and look to a
wider range of sources when making decisions. What this means for
litigants or potential litigants familiar with the American and English
court systems is that while the Indian court system may look familiar,
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Indian judges often write highly emotional opinions and are not
nearly as impartial as many of their international counterparts. They
seek to do what they feel is right. Thus, when faced with the Bhopal
disaster in the courts, the Supreme Court used a case before it, the
Shriram case,239 to create the "absolute liability" standard that it an-
ticipated the lower courts would need in the Bhopal litigation. As
discussed below, Indian courts can and will take active steps in enforc-
ing legislation-even going to the extremes of creating pollution re-
view and monitoring teams and shutting down large numbers of
polluting industries.
India's activist judiciary has been creative with the issue of stand-
ing.240 Unlike their British and American counterparts, Indian courts
have allowed virtually anyone with a bona fide claim to use the courts
to enforce laws and constitutional provisions in the public interest.
Such liberal treatment of standing may account for the flood of public
interest litigation as well as the rise in industry anxieties over their
business investments.
The Supreme Court's liberal and innovative views on standing
were summed up in the 1982 case, S.P. Gupta v. President of India,)41
in which it held:
Today a vast revolution is taking place in the judicial process. The
theatre of law is fast changing and the problems of the poor are
coming to the forefront. The Court has to innovate new methods
and devise new strategies for the purpose of providing access to jus-
tice to large masses of people who are denied their basic human
fights and to whom freedom and liberty have no meaning. The only
way in which this can be done is by entertaining Writ Petitions and
even letters from public spirited individuals seeking judicial redress
for the benefit of persons who have suffered a legal wrong or legal
injury or whose constitutional or legal rights have been violated, but
who, by reason of their poverty or socially or economically disad-
vantaged position are unable to approach the Court for relief.
2 42
In 1991 the Supreme Court went even further in clarifying its
sweeping condemnation of the traditional standing doctrine adhered
to in the British and American systems in 1991, when it held:
In fact, public spirited citizens having faith in rule of law are render-
ing great social and legal service by espousing causes of public na-
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ture. They cannot be ignored or overlooked on technical or
conservative yardsticks of the rule of locus standi or absence of per-
sonal injury or loss. Present day development of this branch of ju-
risprudence is towards freer movement, both in nature of litigation
and approach of the courts.
2 43
Following in the footsteps of the liberal and activist Supreme
Court, the High Courts of the States have broadly adopted the same
approach to the issue of standing in environmental cases. Thus, the
entire judiciary has stepped in to try to enforce the laws and the rights
of citizens where the legislative and executive branches of government
in India have been either unwilling or unable to do so.
IX. Environmental Public Interest Litigation
Citizen protest against industry and other businesses manifests it-
self through public interest litigation. As discussed in the section
above on India's activist judiciary, the Indian Courts have liberally
construed the issues of standing and redressability of claims. While
tort claim plaintiffs may face a system of "Bleak House" proportions,
public interest litigants have been remarkably successful and prolific.
Examples of the wide range and potential impacts of public interest
litigation follow.
A. The East Coast Road Project
The East Coast Road Project, financed by the Asian Develop-
ment Bank, was expected to connect the city of Madras, the capital of
Tamil Nadu, with Kanyakumari, the southernmost tip of the Indian
peninsula.244 The project was to extend existing roads in many places
and create roads where none existed before. The average width of the
road was to be forty-five meters. 4 - Part of the road was to run
through Pondicherry, a small Union Territory and an erstwhile French
settlement.2 Environmentalists, concerned about the long term im-
pacts of such a coastal road, came up with alternatives, which included
shifting the road further inland, reducing the width of the road, and
improving existing roads?47 The government of Tamil Nadu refused
to consider the alternatives and began to cut down trees and evict
243. Bangalre Medical Trust v. Mudappa, 1991 A.I.Rt 1902 (S.C.) (India).
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residents from the area. The Consumer Action Group and Madras,
two nonprofit environmental trusts, along with concerned groups and
individuals, filed a writ petition in the Madras High Court to force the
government to abandon the project.248 The High Court initially ad-
mitted the writ petition and granted interim orders prohibiting the
cutting down of trees on the entire 178 kilometer stretch of phase one
of the project.249 The government of Tamil Nadu then sought project
clearance from the government of India as required under a notifica-
tion intended to protect the coastal zone.250 The Ministry of Environ-
ment and Forests referred the project to a committee appointed to
examine tourism issues.25' The Committee cleared the project, sub-
ject to certain conditions. 252 Among these conditions were the follow-
ing stipulations: that the government not permit the zoning of
industries and hotels on the seaward side of the road; that the govern-
ment consider alternatives suggested by NGOs before commencing
phase two of the project; that adequate compensation be paid to the
people whose land had been acquired for the project; that evictions of
people from their homes be stopped; and that the government plant
trees along the entire length of the road. 3 The Committee further
stipulated that the government of Tamil Nadu should scale down the
width of the road from the proposed forty-five meters to 7.5 meters. 4
The government of Tamil Nadu accepted these conditions and based
on this acceptance, the High Court vacated the interim order.2 55
B. Wetlands Protection
The government of Tamil Nadu, a coastal south Indian state, pro-
posed to build a memorial for Dr. Ambedkar, the architect of the
Constitution, in a low-lying wetland in Madras city.256 This wetland
served to recharge the supply of groundwater, which is a major source
of drinking water for Madras city.
About 175 species of birds (out of which seventy-three are migra-
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a writ petition in the Madras High Court challenging the government
proposal. 5 s The High Court found that there was no justification for
the proposal to construct an auditorium but permitted the construc-
tion of a memorial covering a three-fourths acre of wetland instead of
the five acres initially planned 519 The Court also ordered the mainte-




In 1991 the government of India, recognizing that the ecology of
the coast required protection, issued the Coastal Regulation Zone No-
tification (CRZN) under the EPA and the Environment Protection
Rules. 261 The CRZN mandated the preparation of coastal manage-
ment plans by all of the coastal states of India and transferred the
power to regulate all building and industrial activities from the local
authorities to the central government.-62 Aggrieved by the fact that
states were neither preparing coastal plans nor regulating activity
within 500 meters of the high tide line, the Indian Council for Enviro-
Legal Action, an organization founded by prominent environmental
lawyer M.C. Mehta, filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court to pre-
vent such unauthorized activity.2 63 In December 1994, after issuing
notice to the states, the Court directed coastal states to enjoin place-
ment of industry or new construction within 500 meters of the high
tide line.2'
D. The Bhitarkanika Case
On April 22, 1994, the Centre for Environmental Law (CEL), a
unit of World Wide Fund for Nature, India, filed a writ petition in the
Cuttack High Court seeking to preserve the Bhitarkanika Wildlife
Sanctuary and Gahirmatha National Park from further illegal devel-
opment in contravention of the 1986 Wildlife (Protection) Act.'" 5 The
government of Orissa had persisted in building roads, bridges, and jet-
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around the sanctuary.266 The petition sought a stay on illegal develop-
ment activity in the area, the appointment of a committee to conduct
an EIA of planned developments and a determination of areas in
need of protection, and the requisite manpower to enable authorities
to enforce the protection laws and orders.267 In July 1994, the High
Court ordered that construction be stopped and an EIA be pre-
pared.2" On January 27, 1995, in light of the Supreme Court's De-
cember 1994 order in Indian Council for Environmental Action v.
Union of India discussed above, the Cuttack High Court postponed
further hearings pending developments in the Supreme Court case.269
E. The Narayan Sarovar Sanctuary Case
The Narayan Sarovar Wildlife Sanctuary is the only desert forest
in India. Recently it was "denotified" (removed from protected sta-
tus) by the Gujarat state government.270 The original 765.79 square
kilometer area was reduced in 1993 to 94.87 square kilometers.2 71
Both the Consumer Education and Research Centre and the CEL
have filed separate suits against the government of Gujarat and the
central government respectively. Both cases are still pending, but in-
dustrial development meanwhile continues unabated in the denotified
Sanctuary area.
F. Pollution Control Cases
In 1995 the Supreme Court took a radical step when it closed
thirty companies in West Bengal following the Environment Minis-
try's finding that the companies were not in compliance with environ-
mental regulations.272 The order was prompted by a public interest
petition fied by environmental lawyer M.C. Mehta alleging numerous
violations of pollution control standards.
In a similar case in April 1995, the Gujarat High Court ordered
756 highly polluting chemical units, most of which produce dyes for
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cease production. 273 Since then, the court has broadened its order to
encompass a review of an estimated 3000 chemical plants.274 To date,
almost 100 plants have actually been shut down. In an attempt to
keep the smaller plants open, an industry group, United Phosphorus
Limited, provided $5 million as capital for a common effluent treat-
ment plant that will service seventy-nine units.275 Industry fears of
closure remain high, however, largely due to the limited number of
plants to be serviced, the anticipated delay, and the increased costs of
treatment.2
7 6
Thus, while plaintiffs are often stymied in tort, other avenues of
litigation remain open to Indian activists. Beyond these formal chan-
nels lies the avenue of NGO and citizen protests. These protests have
garnered much international attention and have proved remarkably
successful in both delaying and halting the progress of environmen-
tally unsound projects.
X. Pressure on Industries from NGOs Concerned About
the Environment
NGOs and less formally grouped citizens are extremely active in
India, staging general protests and acting as catalysts to public interest
litigation. Citizens groups react very strongly to perceived threats to
the environment and potential relocation by industries. The Narmada
Valley Project's history is rife with examples of protests and pressure
from NGOs and citizens, both in and out of the courtroom. 277 Protest
techniques include well-publicized hunger strikes, sit-ins, and in-
stances where people block roads and drape their bodies over con-
struction equipment in order to slow the progress of dam building
projects.
During the summer of 1995, NGOs and citizens forced DuPont to
relocate its Nylon 6,6 plant from Goa, where DuPont had already
purchased the land, to Tamil Nadu. Protestors in Goa, wary of the
perceived environmental threats of the project, went so far as to bum
police vans in protest. Meanwhile, DuPont's future in India is still up
in the air, as NGOs in Goa have already begun a campaign to educate
273. India Attacks Chemical Polluters, CHaMIeAL Wit., Apr. 26, 1995, at 6, avadable in
LEXIS, News Library, Asapii File.
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their counterparts in Tamil Nadu about the threats of the project and
effective techniques to derail it.
278
In 1995 alone, communities in India have forced the government
to issue closure orders on more than 10,000 highly polluting industrial
units.279 While specific cases of public interest litigation are discussed
above, these closures should not be viewed as isolated cases, but
rather as a show of force, en masse, by India's NGOs and citizens.
About 9000 of the closure orders affected small units in New Delhi.280
In general, these orders were brought about by communities filing suit
over harm to the environment, particularly to drinking water. K.P.
Nyati, head of the environment management division of the Confed-
eration of Indian Industry thus described the impetus behind the clo-
sures: "These changes have not been forced from above [but] by a
groundswell of public opinion."' A 1995 Gallup poll in India found
that 51% of those polled believed the nation's environmental
problems were "very serious," and almost 21% believed that India's
biggest problems as a nation were those related to the environment .26
This is astonishing for a country in which, according to UNICEF esti-
mates, one-third of the population is malnourished. 283
It is this "groundswell" that politically and socially distinguishes
the new India from the old. While the government may have insti-
tuted economic reforms that have opened up large foreign investment
opportunities in all sectors of India's economy, legislation designed to
protect the environment remains largely aspirational, due to difficul-
ties in enforcement. In addition, India's tort law provides little, and
certainly not immediate, relief to plaintiffs. However, the overwhelm-
ing concern of Indian citizens and NGOs in maintaining and improv-
ing their environment, in combination with their unflagging activism,
is the true enforcement mechanism behind environmental regulations
for industries and private parties conducting business in the country.
It is virtually a project prerequisite that approval, consent, and consul-
tation of communities be obtained before a major project is launched;
otherwise, as Enron, DuPont, the Narmada backers, and countless
278. Frederick Noronha, A Shredded Project, DOWN TO EARTH, Aug. 31, 1995, at 22.
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others can attest, the pressure on businesses and the government to
halt, derail, and delay projects is continual.
XI. Conclusion
To the uninformed observer, India's current emphasis on eco-
nomic development seems to eclipse its environmental protection ef-
forts. But the combination of strong legislative mandates, an activist
judiciary, aggressive public interest litigators, and a proliferation of
highly committed environmental NGOs means that India is no longer
the haven it once was for industries indifferent to environmental
values.
Thus, one may hope that the history of environmental degrada-
tion that has characterized investment in India's power and industrial
sectors has begun to slow. Foreign investment in these traditional ar-
eas, and in the newer area of pollution control technology, is marked
by increasing environmental awareness and regulation. With the work
of concerned citizens and international and domestic NGOs supple-
menting judicial and legislative efforts, India's balance between eni-
ronment and development is beginning to appear more evenly
weighted. As sustainable development becomes the prevailing norm
worldwide, India may serve as a paradigm of a modernizing economy
moving toward that objective.
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